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Etika i racionalnost glasovanja

Posted by Aleksandar Joksić dana 10/09/2016

Nedavno je na SEP-u izašao članak o etici i racionalnosti glasovanja autora Jasona Brennana pa sam mislio da bi bilo prigodno s obzirom na sutrašnje izbore prenijeti nekoliko izvadaka.

Sadržaj članka je sljedeći:

1.Is it rational for an individual citizen to vote?

2.Is there a moral duty to vote?images

3.Are there moral obligations regarding how citizens vote?

4.Is it justifiable for governments to compel citizens to vote?

5.Is it permissible to buy, trade, and sell votes?

6.Who ought to have the right to vote, and should every citizen have an equal vote?


Započinje poznatim parodoksom glasovanja…

The act of voting has an opportunity cost. It takes time and effort that could be used for other valuable things, such as working for pay, volunteering at a soup kitchen, or playing video games. Further, identifying issues, gathering political information, thinking or deliberating about that information, and so on, also take time and effort which could be spent doing other valuable things. Economics, in its simplest form, predicts that rational people will perform an activity only if doing so maximizes expected utility. However, it appears, at least at first glance, that for nearly every individual citizen, voting does not maximize expected utility. This leads to the “paradox of voting”(Downs 1957): Since the expected costs (including opportunity costs) of voting appear to exceed the expected benefits, and since voters could always instead perform some action with positive overall utility, it’s surprising that anyone votes.

However, whether voting is rational or not depends on just what voters are trying to do. Instrumental theories of the rationality of voting hold that it can be rational to vote when the voter’s goal is to influence or change the outcome of an election, including the “mandate” the winning candidate receives. (The mandate theory of elections holds that a candidate’s effectiveness in office, i.e., her ability to get things done, is in part a function of how large or small a lead she had over her competing candidates during the election.) In contrast, the expressive theory of voting holds that voters vote in order to express themselves and their fidelity to certain groups or ideas.


O instrumentalnom glasovanju…

One reason a person might vote is to influence, or attempt to change, the outcome of an election. Suppose there are two candidates, D and R. Suppose Sally prefers D to R; she believes that D would do a trillion dollars more overall good than R would do. If her beliefs were correct, then by hypothesis, it would be best if D won.

However, this does not yet show it is rational for Sally to vote for D. Instead, this depends on how likely it is that her vote will make a difference. In much the same way, it might be worth $200 million to win the lottery, but that does not imply it is rational to buy a lottery ticket.


Thus, on both of these popular models, for most voters in most elections, voting for the purpose of trying to change the outcome is irrational. The expected costs exceed the expected benefits by many orders of magnitude.


O ekspresivnom glasovanju. Zvuči poznato?

The expressive theory of voting (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993) holds that voters vote in order to express themselves. On the expressive theory, voting is a consumption activity rather than a productive activity; it is more like reading a book for pleasure than it is like reading a book to develop a new skill. On this theory, though the act of voting is private, voters regard voting as an apt way to demonstrate and express their commitment to their political team. Voting is like wearing a Metallica T-shirt at a concert or doing the wave at a sports game. Sports fans who paint their faces the team colors do not generally believe that they, as individuals, will change the outcome of the game, but instead wish to demonstrate their commitment to their team. Even when watching games alone, sports fans cheer and clap for their teams. Perhaps voting is like this.

This “expressive theory of voting” is untroubled by and indeed partly supported by the empirical findings that most voters are ignorant about basic political facts (Somin 2013; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). The expressive theory is also untroubled by and indeed partly supported by work in political psychology showing that most citizens suffer from significant “intergroup bias”: we tend to automatically form groups, and to be irrationally loyal to and forgiving of our own group while irrationally hateful of other groups (Lodge and Taber 2013; Haidt 2012; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann 2006; Westen 2008). Voters might adopt ideologies in order to signal to themselves and others that they are certain kinds of people. For example, suppose Bob wants to express that he is a patriot and a tough guy. He thus endorses hawkish military actions, e.g., that the United States nuke Russia for interfering with Ukraine. It would be disastrous for Bob were the US to do what he wants. However, since Bob’s individual vote for a militaristic candidate has little hope of being decisive, Bob can afford to indulge irrational and misinformed beliefs about public policy and express those beliefs at the polls.

Another simple and plausible argument is that it can be rational to vote in order to discharge a perceived duty to vote (Mackie 2010). Surveys indicate that most citizens in fact believe there is a duty to vote or to “do their share” (Mackie 2010: 8–9). If there are such duties, and these duties are sufficiently weighty, then it would be rational for most voters to vote.


O jednom popularnom, ali lošem, argumentu koji vidi glasovanje kao moralnu dužnost građana…

What if everyone were to stay home and not vote? The results would be disastrous! Therefore, I (you/she) should vote. (Lomasky and G. Brennan 2000: 75)

This popular argument can be parodied in a way that exposes its weakness. Consider:

What if everyone were to stay home and not farm? Then we would all starve to death! Therefore, I (you/she) should each become farmers. (Lomasky and G. Brennan 2000: 76)

The problem with this argument, as stated, is that even if it would be disastrous if no one or too few performed some activity, it does not follow that everyone ought to perform it. Instead, one conclude that it matters that sufficient number of people perform the activity. In the case of farming, we think it’s permissible for people to decide for themselves whether to farm or not, because market incentives suffice to ensure that enough people farm.


O moralnoj dužnosti načina glasovanja…

Most people appear to believe that there is a duty to cast a vote (perhaps including a blank ballot) rather than abstain (Mackie 2010: 8–9), but this leaves open whether they believe there is a duty to vote in any particular way. Some philosophers and political theorists have argued there are ethical obligations attached to how one chooses to vote. For instance, many deliberative democrats (see Christiano 2006) believe not only that every citizen has a duty to vote, but also that they must vote in publicly-spirited ways, after engaging in various forms of democratic deliberation. In contrast, some (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993; J. Brennan 2009; J. Brennan 2011a) argue that while there is no general duty to vote (abstention is permissible), those citizens who do choose to vote have duties affecting how they vote. They argue that while it is not wrong to abstain, it is wrong to vote badly, in some theory-specified sense of “badly”.


Teorija glasačke etike može sadržavati odgovore na bilo koja od sljedećih pitanja…

  1. The Intended Beneficiary of the Vote: Whose interests should the voter take into account when casting a vote? May the voter vote selfishly, or should she vote sociotropically? If the latter, on behalf of which group ought she vote: her demographic group(s), her local jurisdiction, the nation, or the entire world? Is it permissible to vote when one has no stake in the election, or is otherwise indifferent to the outcome?

  2. The Substance of the Vote: Are there particular candidates or policies that the voter is obligated to support, or not to support? For instance, is a voter obligated to vote for whatever would best produce the most just outcomes, according to the correct theory of justice? Must the voter vote for candidates with good character? May the voter vote strategically, or must she vote in accordance with her sincere preferences?

  3. Epistemic Duties Regarding Voting: Are voters required to have a particular degree of knowledge, or exhibit a particular kind of epistemic rationality, in forming their voting preferences? Is it permissible to vote in ignorance, on the basis of beliefs about social scientific matters that are formed without sufficient evidence?


Važan dio o epistemičkoj etici glasovanja…

Consider the question: What do doctors owe patients, parents owe children, or jurors owe defendants (or, perhaps, society)? Doctors owe patients proper care, and to discharge their duties, they must 1) aim to promote their patients’ interests, and 2) reason about how to do so in a sufficiently informed and rational way. Parents similarly owe such duties to their children. Jurors similarly owe society at large, or perhaps more specifically the defendant, duties to 1) try to determine the truth, and 2) do so in an informed and rational way. The doctors, parents, and jurors are fiduciaries of others. They owe a duty of care, and this duty of care brings with it certain epistemic responsibilities.

One might try to argue that voters owe similar duties of care to the governed. Perhaps voters should vote 1) for what they perceive to be the best outcomes (consistent with strategic voting) and 2) make such decisions in a sufficiently informed and rational way. How voters vote has significant impact on political outcomes, and can help determine matters of peace and war, life and death, prosperity and poverty. Majority voters do not just choose for themselves, but for everyone, including dissenting minorities, children, non-voters, resident aliens, and people in other countries affected by their decisions. For this reason, voting seems to be a morally charged activity (Christiano 2006; Brennan 2011a; Beerbohm 2012).

That said, one clear disanalogy between the relationship doctors have with patients and voters have with the governed is that individual voters have only a vanishingly small chance of making a difference. The expected harm of an incompetent individual vote is vanishingly small, while the expected harm of incompetent individual medical decisions is high.

However, perhaps the point holds anyway. Define a “collectively harmful activity” as an activity in which a group is imposing or threatening to impose harm, or unjust risk of harm, upon other innocent people, but the harm will be imposed regardless of whether individual members of that group drop out. It’s plausible that one might have an obligation to refrain from participating in such activities, i.e., a duty to keep one’s hands clean.

To illustrate, Suppose a 100-member firing squad is about to shoot an innocent child. Each bullet will hit the child at the same time, and each shot would, on its own, be sufficient to kill her. You cannot stop them, so the child will die regardless of what you do. Now, suppose they offer you the opportunity to join in and shoot the child with them. You can make the 101st shot. Again, the child will die regardless of what you do. Is it permissible for you join the firing squad? Most people have a strong intuition that it is wrong to join the squad and shoot the child. One plausible explanation of why it is wrong is that there may be a general moral prohibition against participating in these kinds of activities. In these kinds of cases, we should try to keep our hands clean.

Perhaps this “clean-hands principle” can be generalized to explain why individual acts of ignorant, irrational, or malicious voting are wrong. The firing-squad example is somewhat analogous to voting in an election. Adding or subtracting a shooter to the firing squad makes no difference—the girl will die anyway. Similarly, with elections, individual votes make no difference. In both cases, the outcome is causally overdetermined. Still, the irresponsible voter is much like a person who volunteers to shoot in the firing squad. Her individual bad vote is of no consequence—just as an individual shot is of no consequence—but she is participating in a collectively harmful activity when she could easily keep her hands clean (Brennan 2011a, 68–94).


Bi li svi trebali imati jednako pravo glasa?

The dominant view among political philosophers is that we ought to have some sort of representative democracy, and that each adult ought to have one vote, of equal weight to every other adult’s, in any election in her jurisdiction. This view has recently come under criticism, though, both from friends and foes of democracy.

Before one even asks whether “one person, one vote” is the right policy, one needs to determine just who counts as part of the demos. Call this the boundary problem or the problem of constituting the demos (Goodin 2007: 40). Democracy is the rule of the people. But one fundamental question is just who constitutes “the people”. This is no small problem. Before one can judge that a democracy is fair, or adequately responds to citizens’ interests, one needs to know who “counts” and who does not.

One might be inclined to say that everyone living under a particular government’s jurisdiction is part of the demos and is thus entitled to a vote. However, in fact, most democracies exclude children and teenagers, felons, the mentally infirm, and non-citizens living in a government’s territory from being able to vote, but at the same time allow their citizens living in foreign countries to vote (López-Guerra 2014: 1).


I najkontroverzniji i najzanimljiviji dio: epistokracija.

Early defenders of democracy were concerned to show democracy is superior to aristocracy, monarchy, or oligarchy. However, in recent years, epistocracy has emerged as a major contender to democracy (Estlund 2003, 2007; Landemore 2012). A system is said to be epistocratic to the extent that the system formally allocates political power on the basis of knowledge or political competence. For instance, an epistocracy might give university-educated citizens additional votes (Mill 1861), exclude citizens from voting unless they can pass a voter qualification exam, weigh votes by each voter’s degree of political knowledge while correcting for the influence of demographic factors, or create panels of experts who have the right to veto democratic legislation (Caplan 2007; J. Brennan 2011b; López-Guerra 2014; Mulligan 2015).

Arguments for epistocracy generally center on concerns about democratic incompetence. Epistocrats hold that democracy imbues citizens with the right to vote in a promiscuous way. Ample empirical research has shown that the mean, median, and modal levels of basic political knowledge (let alone social scientific knowledge) among citizens is extremely low (Somin 2013; Caplan 2007; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Further, political knowledge makes a significant difference in how citizens vote and what policies they support (Althaus 1998, 2003; Caplan 2007; Gilens 2012). Epistocrats believe that restricting or weighting votes would protect against some of the downsides of democratic incompetence.

One argument for epistocracy is that the legitimacy of political decisions depends upon them being made competently and in good faith. Consider, as an analogy: In a criminal trial, the jury’s decision is high stakes; their decision can remove a person’s rights or greatly harm their life, liberty, welfare, or property. If a jury made its decision out of ignorance, malice, whimsy, or on the basis of irrational and biased thought processes, we arguably should not and probably would not regard the jury’s decision as authoritative or legitimate. Instead, we think the criminal has a right to a trial conducted by competent people in good faith. In many respects, electoral decisions are similar to jury decisions: they also are high stakes, and can result in innocent people losing their lives, liberty, welfare, or property. If the legitimacy and authority of a jury decision depends upon the jury making a competent decision in good faith, then perhaps so should the legitimacy and authority of most other governmental decisions, including the decisions that electorates and their representatives make. Now, suppose, in light of widespread voter ignorance and irrationality, it turns out that democratic electorates tend to make incompetent decisions. If so, then this seems to provide at least presumptive grounds for favoring epistocracy over democracy (J. Brennan 2011b).

Some dispute whether epistocracy would in fact perform better than democracy, even in principle. Epistocracy generally attempts to generate better political outcomes by in some way raising the average reliability of political decision-makers. Political scientists Lu Hong and Scott Page (2004) adduced a mathematical theorem showing that under the right conditions, cognitive diversity among the participants in a collective decision more strongly contributes to the group making a smart decision than does increasing the individual participants’ reliability. On the Hong-Page theorem, it is possible that having a large number of diverse but unreliable decision-makers in a collective decision will outperform having a smaller number of less diverse but more reliable decision-makers. There is some debate over whether the Hong-Page theorem has any mathematical substance (Thompson 2014 claims it does not), whether real-world political decisions meet the conditions of the theorem, and, if so, to what extent that justifies universal suffrage, or merely shows that having widespread but restricted suffrage is superior to having highly restricted suffrage (Landemore 2012; Somin 2013: 113–5).

Relatedly, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem holds that under the right conditions, provided the average voter is reliable, as more and more voters are added to a collective decision, the probability that the democracy will make the right choice approaches 1 (List and Goodin 2001). However, assuming the theorem applies to real-life democratic decisions, whether the theorem supports or condemns democracy depends on how reliable voters are. If voters do systematically worse than chance (e.g., Althaus 2003; Caplan 2007), then the theorem instead implies that large democracies almost always make the wrong choice.

One worry about certain froms of epistocracy, such as a system in which voters must earn the right to vote by passing an examination, is that such systems might make decisions that are biased toward members of certain demographic groups. After all, political knowledge is not evenly dispersed among all demographic groups. On average, in the United States, on measures of basic political knowledge, whites know more than blacks, people in the Northeast know more than people in the South, men know more than women, middle-aged people know more than the young or old, and high-income people know more than the poor (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996: 137–177). If such a voter examination system were implemented, the resulting electorate would be whiter, maler, richer, more middle-aged, and better employed than the population at large. Democrats might reasonably worry that for this very reason an epistocracy would not take the interests of non-whites, women, the poor, or the unemployed into proper consideration.

However, at least one form of epistocracy may be able to avoid this objection. Consider, for instance, the “enfranchisement lottery”:

The enfranchisement lottery consists of two devices. First, there would be a sortition to disenfranchise the vast majority of the population. Prior to every election, all but a random sample of the public would be excluded. I call this device the exclusionary sortition because it merely tells us who will not be entitled to vote in a given contest. Indeed, those who survive the sortition (the pre-voters) would not be automatically enfranchised. Like everyone in the larger group from which they are drawn, pre-voters would be assumed to be insufficiently competent to vote. This is where the second device comes in. To finally become enfranchised and vote, pre-voters would gather in relatively small groups to participate in a competence-building process carefully designed to optimize their knowledge about the alternatives on the ballot. (López-Guerra 2014: 4; cf. Ackerman and Fishkin 2005)Under this scheme, no one has any presumptive right to vote. Instead, everyone has, by default, equal eligibility to be selected to become a voter. Before the enfranchisement lottery takes place, candidates would proceed with their campaigns as they do in democracy. However, they campaign without knowing which citizens in particular will eventually acquire the right to vote. Immediately before the election, a random but representative subset of citizens is then selected by lottery. These citizens are not automatically granted the right to vote. Instead, the chosen citizens merely acquire permission to earn the right to vote. To earn this right, they must then participate in some sort of competence-building exercise, such as studying party platforms or meeting in a deliberative forum with one another. In practice this system might suffer corruption or abuse, but, epistocrats respond, so does democracy in practice. For epistocrats, the question is which system works better, i.e., produces the best or most substantively just outcomes, all things considered.

One important deontological objection to epistocracy is that it may be incompatible with public reason liberalism (Estlund 2007). Public reason liberals hold that distribution of coercive political power is legitimate and authoritative only if all reasonable people subject to that power have strong enough grounds to endorse a justification for that power (Vallier and D’Agostino 2013). By definition, epistocracy imbues some citizens with greater power than others on the grounds that these citizens have greater social scientific knowledge. However, the objection goes, reasonable people could disagree about just what counts as expertise and just who the experts are. If reasonable people disagree about what counts as expertise and who the experts are, then epistocracy distributes political power on terms not all reasonable people have conclusive grounds to endorse. Epistocracy thus distributes political power on terms not all reasonable people have conclusive grounds to endorse. (See, however, Mulligan 2015.)


Ima još o etici kupovanja glasova i pravednosti obveznog glasovanja. Read the whole thing. 


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Masovni pokreti i demokracija

Posted by Joško Žanić dana 20/08/2013

Prenosim tekst Danila Mandića, doktoranda sociologije na Harvardu, objavljen u online izdanju beogradske Politike ( 16. 8. 2013., kao i početak naše debate inicijalno vođene putem emaila:Protesters

Tri Lekcije iz Demokratije: Društveni Pokreti u Turskoj i Brazilu

                Vojna brutalnost u Egiptu je ponovo obradovala ljubitelje ironije. Zar je moguće da jedan demokratski revolucionarni pokret, kome je zavideo ceo svet, za manje od dve godine stvara svoju sopstvenu noćnu moru? Zar da jedan istorijski trenutak nacionalnog ujedinjenja postane uvodna špica za gradjanski rat? Zar je lek protiv Mubaraka pogoršao stvari više od bolesti?

                Moglo bi se oprostiti mišljenje da je sve krenulo naopako upravo zbog masovnih društvenih pokreta. Zaboravljamo da u drugim društvima slični pokreti nisu otvorili pandorinu kutiju, već učvrstili i demokratiju i (uprkos površnom utisku) dugoročnu stabilnost.

                Kao večiti general posle bitke, društvena nauka je bila zatečena vrelim letom u Turskoj i Brazilu. Masovni protesti (još nedovršeni) su uzrujali svetska tržišta, naježili vladare na svim kontinentima, i probili nacionalne rekorde po veličini, rasprostranjenosti, i broju žrtava. Kritičari kapitalizma su videli zakasnelu reakciju na svetski neoliberalni poredak, dok su entuzijasti doživeli nemire kao lokalizovane, kratkotrajne i bezazlene (“bolovi rast,” kažu urednici Washington Post-a).[1] Izmedju Arapskih proleća i Egipatskog puča, ovi nemiri su poučan pogled u budućnost – uz dužni optimizam – i za zemlje našeg kalibra.

                Lekcija #1. Društveni pokreti će biti u porastu uz demokratizaciju. Decenijama je teza bila da će uz širenje demokratije pokreti erozijom nestajati. Kada ljudima obezbedite formalne demokratske kanale, oni će odložiti svoje pištaljke i gas maske zarad glasačkih listića. Denjel Bel, sveta krava Harvarda, je uveravao da su masovni pokreti, uz ideologiju, stvar prošlosti. Medjunarodna tela ubedjuju autokratske režime (uključujući Sirijski) da se prepuste demokratiji ne iz ljubavi prema zapadu, već zbog samointeresa. Ako želite trajno eliminisati javne nemire, demokratizujte! Turske vlasti su 2007 sa rekordnih 50% glasova ušli u parlament, postali model parlamentarne integracije Islamskih stranaka u Egiptu i Tunisu, pa čak i sa Kurdima napravili značajne korake (nečuvene za, recimo, Tursku devedesetih). Brazilski put od autoritaritarizma i vojne diktature do Obamine ode Brazilu kao “modelu demokratije za Arapski svet“ (2011) je bio jednako impresivan. U oba društva, ipak, pokreti su eksplodirali ne samo uprkos funkcionalnih demokratskih institucija i slobodnih izbora, već zbog i protiv njih.

                Lekcija #2. Nedefinisanost je prednost. Poredjenja Turskih i Brazilskih protesta sa “Okupiraj Vol Strit” su površna, ali razumljiva: te pokrete karakteriše nedostatak jasne organizacione hijerarhije, raznolikost vodja i predstavnika (ako se uopšte mogu identifikovati), i tvrdoglav otpor prema rešavanju problema formalnim institucionalnim kanalima. Još veselije, ispostavilo se da su originalni zahtevi enviromentalista za održavanje trga Taksin, odnosno korisnika autobusa za smanjenje cena karata, samo vrh ledenog brega. U pokrete su uletele struje iz praktično svih ideoloških i demografskih kategorija (takozvani “I mi smo ovde!” pokreti). Sa kim i o čemu, onda, država da pregovara? Brazilske vlasti, a Erdogan još više, su raznolikost demonstracija izjednačili sa vandalizmom i ekstremizmom, te lakše opravdali prekomernu silu. Ali strategija nedefinisanosti ima i svoje prednosti. Ti pokreti su masovniji, inkluzivniji, izdržljiviji i fleksibilniji u svojim zahtevima. Državne koncesije, zbog takvog pritiska, su osvojene u više oblasti. Iluzija je bila da će institucionalna demokratija obezvrediti vaninstitucionalnu mobilizaciju; naprotiv, prva ne funkcioniše bez druge.

                Lekcija broj #3. Ekonomski rast ne znači ništa. Takozvana “nova tržišta,” medju kojima su Turska i Brazil bila najuzornija, imaju 80% svetskog stanovništva a 40% globalne ekonomije. Dok je razvijene zemlje razarala kriza, ove buduće super-privrede su dosledno rasle i do 8% godišnje. Priliv i stvaranje kapitala su bili sve impresivniji, dok se siromaštvo i nezaposlenost smanjivala po stopi o kojoj Evropa sanja. Od 2003 do 2011, četrdeset miliona brazilaca je iz siromaštva prešlo u srednju klasu.  Turska je postala udžbenički primer sužavanja nejednakosti, a samo od turizma zaradjuje više nego BDP većine zemalja sveta. Kada dovoljno ljudi uživa u nekoj verziji Američkog sna, govorilo se, masovni protesti će biti nepotrebni. Ko je lud da ide na ulicu ako ima frižider, automobil i svoju malu bašticu? Ispostavilo se, naprotiv, da rast srednje klase znači i rast srednjoklasnih zahteva. Državni kapacitet izvesno počne da zaostaje za javnim očekivanjima. Glavni motor društvenih pokreta je upravo bila nesposobnost političkih institucija da isprate nagle promene u ekonomskoj sferi. Sasvim suprotno od triumfalističkih teza mnogih ekonomista, privredni rast je talac društvene i političke podloge.

Sociolozi su sjajni u predikcijama…o prošlosti. Često se čuje pitanje: “kada će ti političari konačno početi da rade ono što treba?” Odgovor iz Turske i Brazila je jasan: kada ih društveni pokreti nateraju na to. Sebi smemo dopustiti ovo predvidjanje: demokratija će biti onoliko kvalitetna koliko je konstantnog, udruženog i agresivnog javnog pritiska.


Osobno nisam pretjerano sklon javnom hučanju – mislim da je ono potrebno onda kad demokratske institucije još nisu uspostavljene ili kad zakažu, ali poželjno je za stabilnost (jednom uspostavljenog demokratskog) društva da ga je što manje.  A javni pokreti su inherentno nestabilni i nepredvidljivi. Ono što mislim da jest ključno za demokraciju je javna scena, javna debata, javna kritika, osobito recimo u situaciji gdje postoji opasnost da radikalne snage dođu na vlast – no, to je debata i kritika koja se odvija preko medija, ne marširanje masa. S druge strane, ako neki tip totalitarnog pokreta dođe na vlast u nekoj zemlji, onda je već opravdan i oružani otpor, tj. nešto više i agresivnije od “običnog” javnog pokreta. Na trećem mjestu, tu su razne “nevladine” udruge, udruge civilnog društva, koje su uobičajen dio demokracije, i imaju razne agende (u nas, npr., upravo žele referendumom uvesti u ustav definiciju braka kao zajednice muškarca i žene, da bi spriječile gej meridž i apokalipsu kršćanske kulture – eto kako izgleda divna “direktna demokracija” kad nema ona ciljeve koje teoretičari iste primišljaju kad je zastupaju). Dakle, imamo, kao normalne aspekte demokracije: 1. javnu debatu, 2. civilne udruge. Kad i ako na vlast dođu snage koje žele srušiti demokraciju kao takvu, onda već imamo pravo na oružani otpor, ali to već znači da je poredak/procedura otišla kvragu, i da je situacija postala izrazito nepredvidljiva. No, ne vidim veliku ulogu, ni poželjnost, javnih pokreta o kojima govoriš, osobito ako su nedefinirani. Nedefinirani pokret pretvori se u tulum koji se brzo ispuše (occupy whatever).
Čini mi se da si se zaletio kad si rekao da ekonomski rast “ne znači ništa”. Zapravo znači upravo ono što kažeš u nastavku, a na što je lijepo ukazao Fukuyama: uznapredovali kapitalizam ima sklonost potaknuti uspostavu liberalne demokracije (upravo zbog porasta obrazovanog srednjeg sloja). Često se kladim s ljudima da će Kina za manje od 50 godina biti lib dem.


Mislim da osnovnu tezu deliš sa standardnom “modernization theory” pričom: da su pokreti nepotrebni kada je demokratija funkcionalna, a pošto se demokratija širi i razvija oni će postajati redji. Ja kažem da neće biti funkcionalna bez njih i da, as an empirical matter of fact, oni postaju sve češći uz širenje demokratije (prihvatam ti opkladu za Kinu; i dodajem još $1000 da će za 50 godina biti duplo češći i masovniji protesti u Kini kada demokratizuju). Taj generalni pogled istorije bi dobro preispitao.

Parlament, stranke, mediji, sudovi, itd. su sve institucije koje funkcionišu bolje pod javnim pritiskom. Ako je proceduralizam vera u neke andjele, reprezentativce, koji će verno prenositi volju naroda, ne znam gde ih nalaziš. Turska demokratija, recimo, ima više novinara u zatvoru nego BILO KOJA ZEMLJA NA SVETU (i to ne po glavi stanovnika, nego po ukupnom broju). Ovaj letnji pokret je to pitanje “ugurao” u državne institucije na ozbiljan način. Dakle, postalo je deo procedure, ali ne bez tog silnog vaninstitucionalnog marširanja. Ja bi te pitao, da li stvarno misliš da je to konkretno pitanje moglo da se poboljša bez takvog pritiska?

Što se tiče nedefinisanosti, to mi je omiljena tema, ali malo složenija. Drugom prilikom.

Ja nisam govorio o nasilju, pa mi se čini da se više ne slažemo oko terminologije nego oko suštine. Zašto tebi pokreti nisu deo “javne scene”? Kažeš preko medija, a ne marširanjem masa. Malo je to pojednostavljeno. Koji pokret ne ide preko medija? Da li je marširanje kolektivna akcija kao peticija, ili je peticija “medijska” i legitimna, a marširanje ne? U vezi sa tim, kad si rekao tu su razne “nevladine” udruge, udruge civilnog društva, koje su uobičajen dio demokracije, i imaju razne agende,  ti u potpunosti podržavaš moju tezu. Sem ako si spreman da po političkoj predrasudi odredjuješ koji pokret je NVO a koji nije. Da li je Muslimansko Bratstvo NVO? Anti-gej lobi jeste, kažeš, a da li je Brazilski pokret protiv korupcije?

Za totalitarne pokrete se potpuno slažemo, ali namerno sam fokusirao na Tursku i Brazil jer one to nemaju. Ja bi čak rekao da je tobože totalitarna i autoritarna slika Erdogana pogrešna. U najboljem slučaju, to su samo autoritarne TENDENCIJE, česte u demokratijama. Ali pričati o njegovoj diktaturi kao opravdanju za proteste je potpuni promašaj. Niti je on nešto posebno Islamizovao državu (bio, video: alkohol se lakše kupuje nego u Švedskoj. Pitao je “da li verujete zakonu Alaha ili zakonu alkoholičara Ataturka?” Pa šta? Sekularna država načisto. Slabiji razvod crkve i države u Hrvatskoj i Srbiji nego tamo, ja ti garantujem). Protesti su legitimni iz drugih razloga, i bili bi legitimni ČAK i kad država ne bi nasiljem odgovarala kako jeste.

A ekonomski rast stvarno mislim da je precenjen. Od Polanjija pa na dalje, meni se “social embeddedness” urezao u glavu kao sjajan korektiv prema ekonomskom determinizmu. Odakle, pitam opet, ovoliki društveni protesti u “economic miracle” zemljama?


Moja teza nije bila toliko predviđanje o budućoj učestalosti protesta, već stav da oni nisu poželjni u razvijenoj demokraciji – drukčije rečeno, ako jesu učestali, to je indikator da demokratski sustav, procedure i institucije, ne funkcionira dobro, pa ljudi moraju izaći na ulicu.
Ja ne vjerujem u “anđele, reprezentativce”, već u pravila igre, za koja je bolje da se poštuju, inače situacije postaje nepredvidljiva i volatile. Turska je svakako zemlja manjkave demokracije, kao što sam ukazuješ s primjerom novinara u zatvoru (premda si sam kasnije skačeš u usta navođenjem lakoće kupovine alkohola), premda nipošto totalitarna – moja referenca na totalitarizam bila je teoretske naravi, ako-onda scenarij. A budući da je demokracija u Turskoj manjkava, javni protesti su opravdani (i, opet, indikator manjkavosti demokracije).
Oko legitimnih i nelegitimnih pokreta: moj je problem s, takoreći, “disruptivnim” pokretima, koji igraju mimo pravila, uključuju razne tipove blokiranja normalnih “protoka” (onemogućavanje kretanja preko nekog prostora, onemogućavanje obavljanja nekih djelatnosti, itd.). Oni, osim što su inherentno nepredvidljivi i potencijalno eskalantni (npr. neredi u LA-u ’92., koji su se pretvorili u pljačkanje korejskih dućana), također ugrožavaju prava onih koji se ne slažu s njihovim ciljevima i žele normalnu protočnost (recimo, blokade fakulteta u Hrvatskoj prije nekoliko godina, danas traktori na cestama koji blokiraju promet, itd.). Zato mislim da su oni neophodni samo kad je demokracija zakazala (i ovisno o sferi u kojoj je zakazala, ekonomskoj, političkoj, nadalje obrazovnoj, zdravstvenoj, itd.), a inače je poželjno da civilne udruge djeluju prema pravilima, dakle, recimo skupljaju potpise za referendum i sl. Što ne znači da će se ciljevi tih udruga nužno svidjeti onima koji su zagrijani za taj tip djelovanja – v. pod inicijativu za spas “istinskog braka” u Hrvatskoj.
“Economic miracle” zemlje (Brazil, itd.) – opet isto: indikator manjkavosti demokracije (not surprisingly). Korupcija, itd., sustav u nekim aspektima zakazuje ili uopće nije dobro uspostavljen.


Mislim da pričamo u cross purposes jer mešamo normativno i empirijsko. Ali valjda nepoželjnost zavisi od nekih činjenica. Jedna takva činjenica je da će protesti biti sve češći uz demokratizaciju. I?

Drugo činjenica je da ti protesti postaju češći i masovniji u manje maljkavim demokratijama nego u više maljkavim demokratijama. Zar to ne menja našu procenu o opravdanosti-legitimnosti?

Ali moja teza, dakle, se ticala primarily tih činjenica, pa možemo oko njih da se složimo pa da se razdvajamo o normativnoj evaluaciji.

Razvodi braka su nepoželjni, kažemo. Ali sve će biti češći i češći u slobodnim zemljama. I? Bilo bi lepo, u nekom imaginarnom svetu, da većina tih brakova funkcioniše i da se porodični problemi rešavaju za kuhinjskim stolom dijalogom i ljubavlju. Ali većina neće. Treba onda i razmotriti, valjda, da li ti razvodi imaju neku pozitivnu funkciju – po samostalnost, nezavisnost individue, smanjenje nasilja, produktivnost na poslu, šta ti ja znam? Isto tako za pokrete – oni su zdrav korektiv i doprinos svim ti proceduralnim čarima koje pominješ. Pravila igre se učvšćuju uz njih. LA riots upravo su to uradili: pravila igre su bila rasistička, a sada je teže biti policajac koji diskriminiše jer su pokreti to onemogućili.

I nisi mi odgovorio, da li stvarno veruješ da je verovatno da će formalnim procedurama pitanja tipa novinari u Turskoj, rasizam u LAu, itd. se rešiti bez pritiska pokreta? Ne da li je poželjno da se tako reše, nego da li će zapravo?

[1] “Growing pains.”

Posted in politička filozofija | Označeno: , | 22 komentara »

Moralnost, evolucija, normativnost i dostojanstvo

Posted by Joško Žanić dana 26/12/2012

U svome tekstu u The New York Review of Books poznati filozof Thomas Nagel recenzira dvije recentne knjige o pitanjima morala imoralnost etike.

Prva knjiga (J. Haidt, The Righteous Mind) bavi se evolucijskim izvorima moralnosti (neki će reći: ne opet!), koje pronalazi u urođenim modulima i grupnoj selekciji. Knjiga postulira šest različitih tipova moralnog stava, koji se manifestiraju putem intuitivnih, pozitivnih ili negativnih, moralnih reakcija, a koje različite kulture kombiniraju kako bi formirale svoju specifičnu verziju moralnosti: briga/ozljeđivanje, sloboda/ugnjetavanje, poštenje/varanje, lojalnost/izdaja, autoritet/subverzija, svetost/oskvrnuće. Prema Nagelu, Haidt tvrdi da (raz)um ima zanemarivu ulogu u formiranju moralnih stavova – većinom onu post festum racionalizacije – dok se bilo koji uspješni moralni sustav mora temeljiti na ovim instinktivnim, intuitivnim, evolucijski oblikovanim stavovima. Također, Haidt prigovara lijevo-liberalnim pozicijama da naglašavaju samo tri od osnovnih moralnih stavova, naime brigu, slobodu i poštenje, dok konzervativci uzimaju u obzir svih šest, dakle i one koji su liberalima i ljevičarima često odbojni: lojalnost, autoritet i svetost. Upravo ove posljednje tri vrijednosti Haidt smatra presudnima za povezivanje ljudi u zajednici i za osjećaj smislenosti života, a njihovo odbacivanje ili zanemarivanje drži pogubnim. Haidt također smatra da strogo racionalističke, univerzalističke etike nemaju mnogo šanse za uspjeh jer se suviše udaljuju od naše evolucijski oblikovane sposobnosti za moralno rasuđivanje.

Nagel prigovara na sljedećoj ključnoj točki: kakvi god bili evolucijski izvori i urođeni oblici funkcioniranja određenih naših sposobnosti (također, kakvo god bilo socio-kulturno uvjetovanje kojem smo izloženi), u etičkoj diskusiji ne možemo eliminirati određena gledišta zato što naizgled nisu u skladu s ovima. Drukčije rečeno, normativno ne slijedi iz deskriptivnog, te se mi možemo zalagati za određena moralna načela nezavisno od empirijskih činjenica o tome kako nešto (navodno) funkcionira u našem umu ili nekoj zajednici/kulturi. Možemo bez kontradikcije zahtijevati univerzalna moralna pravila bez obzira što “prirodni” um većine ljudi nije sklon takvom načinu mišljenja – to možemo uostalom i zato što ljudski prirodni um jest, barem potencijalno, opremljen sposobnostima rezoniranja na tom nivou. (Za izvrsnu analizu – koja sama ne zauzima moralne/vrijednosne stavove – vrijednosnog sustava kao multidimenzionalnog kognitivnog sustava te odnosa istog prema usvajanju normi karakterističnih za pojedinu kulturu, preporučam Jackendoffovu Language, Consciousness, Culture, pogl. 9-11).

Druga knjiga koju Nagel prikazuje (M. Rosen, Dignity) bavi se pojmom dostojanstva. Nadovezujući se na Kanta, Rosen ustoličuje pojam dostojanstva kao ključan moralni pojam, no, za razliku od Kanta, odvaja ga od pojma prava, što Nagel kritizira. Kao potvrdu za tezu da ideja dostojanstva nema veze s ljudskim interesima (dok prava imaju) Rosen navodi normu, prisutnu u svim kulturama, da se tijela mrtvih tretiraju s poštovanjem. No, Rosen je, tvrdeći kako to tretiranje nema “nikakve veze s interesima preminulog ili bilo koga drugog” po svemu sudeći u krivu: podrijetlo te norme ne treba tražiti samo u cilju ne-širenja zaraze i sl., već, recimo, u ekstenziji norme da tijela drugih osoba treba tretirati s poštovanjem, što znači bez nasilja, itd. Dakle, nije točno da tretiranje mrtvih nema veze s interesima “bilo koga drugog”, jer zapravo ima veze s interesima svih. Dobro je poznato da se pogrebi priređuju, ne zapravo zbog umrlih (njima je doista, moglo bi se reći, svejedno), već zbog ostalih (rodbine, prijatelja, itd.), kako bi si mogli slati razne poruke, “make an appearance”, natjecati se na razne načine, itd. Mislim da i zabrana eutanazije ima sličan temelj: strah da nastupa slippery slope. Dakle, mogućnosti su brojne, među njima i one evolucijske, za dublje objašnjenje ideje dostojanstva i njezine primjene. No, da koncept dostojanstva jest ključan potvrđuju i nedavne revolucije u arapskom svijetu, koje su mnogi komentatori okarakterizirali kao “the quest for dignity”. Radi se, mislim o tome, da je osjećaj vlastitog statusa (bolje: konceptualizacija vlastitog statusa i emotivno-motivacijski mehanizmi s time povezani) jedna od ključnih sastavnica samopercepcije te da je unapređenje tog statusa jedan od ključnih motiva u društvenom djelovanju. Takav motiv može pokrenuti pojedince da riskiraju mnogo toga (life and limb, takoreći) kako bi postigli viši status, kao što može pokrenuti i široke slojeve društva na djelovanje kako bi postigli status koji smatraju da im pripada – odn. kako bi odagnali osjećaj poniženja koji proizlazi iz konceptualizacije svoga statusa kao nedostatnog.

Mislim da među ključne ljudske motive pripadaju djelomično kontrarni motivi statusa i konformizma (premda kao “derivativni” motivi, naime oni čije ispunjenje omogućuje zadovoljenje nekih bazičnijih potreba), a među ključne društvene vrijednosti djelomično kontrarne vrijednosti individualizma i solidarnosti. Svaki pojedinac mora naći neki balans između dotičnih motiva, kao što i svako društvo mora pronaći neki balans između dotičnih vrijednosti.

Posted in biologija, etika, evolucija, filozofija, politička filozofija, psihologijs morala | Označeno: , , | 136 komentara »

Reforme i pritisak

Posted by Pavel Gregoric dana 22/11/2010

Kolega Neven Petrović sa Filozofskog fakulteta u Rijeci održao je u Društvu sveučilišnih nastavnika 17. studenog 2010. kratko izlaganje pod naslovom “Kapitalizam i demokracija”. Izlaganje se temeljilo na kritičkim refleksijama uz dijelove knjige Doktrina šoka od Naomi Klein. U toj knjizi Kleinova optužuje libertarijance da su koristili, ili još uvijek koriste, teške krizne situacije kako bi pokušali u djelo provesti svoje ideje. Ključni primjer koji navodi jest slučaj vojnih režima u Latinskoj Americi, osobito Čileu, u kojima su učenici Miltona Friedmana dobili gotovo slobodne ruke da pokušaju provoditi svoje naume, no cijena za to bio je teror koji su te države provodile nad vlastitim stanovništvom. Petrović se slaže da je to moralno neprihvatljivo, kao i slučajevi namjernog izazivanja ekonomske izvana krize radi uspostave tržišnog modela privrede. Međutim, Petrović ostavlja otvorenom mogućnost moralne dopuštenosti blažih oblika pritiska na ključne strane kada kriza nije izazvana izvana i kada je razložno smatrati da bi ekonomska reforma u smjeru slobodnog tržišta vodila prevladavanju krize, usprkos neraspoloženju većine.

U raspravi je otvoreno sasvim općenito pitanje: pod uvjetima (i) da kriza u određenom sustavu (neovisno o veličini i tipu sustava) nije namjerno izazvana, (ii) da način rješavanja krize osmišljavaju legitimna tijela, (iii) da je način rješavanja krize utemeljen na ozbiljnoj analizi postojećeg stanja i projekcijama budućih ishoda – je li dopušteno te mjere rješavanja krize provoditi bez suglasnosti većine ljudi u tom sustavu? Ako jest, što je sve dopušteno učiniti u cilju provedbe tih mjera s manjinom koja formira i zastupa mišljenje većine u sustavu? Svi smo se složili da ih nije dopušteno ubiti ili mučiti, ali nismo se složili je li dopušteno oteti ih na par dana i izolirati. A je li dopušteno potkupiti ih ili manipulirati? Općenito, može li se formulirati neki univerzalan princip koji nam omogućuje da odlučimo što jest a što nije dopušteno, tj. koliko je makijavelizma moralno prihvatljivo u takvim situacijama?

Posted in etika, politička filozofija | Označeno: , , , | 23 komentara »

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